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The Psychological Stress Evaluator:
Yesterday's Dream - Tomorrow's Nightmare
F ROM TIME IMMEMORIAL, MAN HAS SOUGHT a failsafe method of
truth verification. The techniques have run the gamut from the
ancients' trial by ordeal to modern man's lie detectors. Since the turn
of the century, this search has focused on the development of a device
which would detect deception by measuring the "cause and effect
of psychological stimuli and physiological response"' during the
interrogation of a suspect. Beginning with Cesare Lombroso's primi-
tive attempts in the 1890's 2 through Reid's sophisticated polygraph
3
of today, the desire for a reliable lie detector has continued unabated.
In the 1960's, in response to a burgeoning desire for further refine-
ment, the quest began for a "wireless" lie detector which would
dispense with the need for physical attachment to the subject.4
Interest by the federal government in a "wireless" lie detector
added impetus to the quest ;5 and shortly thereafter the Psychological
Stress Evaluator (PSE) was invented by Alan Bell and Colonel Charles
McQuiston and placed on the market by Dektor Counterintelligence
1 DEKTOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SECURITY, INC., USE OF LIE DETECTORS BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (1974), in Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar
Devices by Federal Agencies Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government
Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 225
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Moorhead Hearings).
2 Lombroso's lie detector was termed the "hydrosphygmograph." The operation consisted of
placing the subject's fist in a tank of water and sealing the tank with a rubber membrane.
Apparently, changes in the subject's pulse and blood pressure occurring during interrogation
were transferred to the water. These changes, as well as those in the water level, were
carried into an air-filled tube that, in turn, led to a revolving smoke drum which recorded
the changes. J. REID & F. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 2 n. 2
(1953).
1 A polygraph, known as the "ink polygraph," was invented as early as 1906, which, though
it was used for medical purposes, operated on the same principles as today's polygraph. Id.
at 233. The modern polygraph measures respiration, pulse, blood pressure, and galvanic
skin response by means of attaching the subject to a pneumograph tube, blood pressure
cuff, and electrodes. A. MOENNSSENS, R. MOSES, & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 541 (1973).
4 Statement by Charles R. McQuiston, Senior Vice President of Dektor Counterintelligence
& Security, Inc., in Moorhead Hearings at 221 [hereinafter Dektor Counterintelligence &
Security, Inc. will be referred to as Dektor].
5 It is quite possible that the government was interested in such a device solely on the basis
of the well-established fact that the polygraph is ineffective in determining deception
where certain chronic psychological or physiological disorders are present, such as heart
disease, psychosis and either high or low blood pressure; or where the individual suffers
from excessive fatigue or is under the influence of certain drugs. F. BAILEY & H. ROTH-
BLAT'r, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES § 371 (1970). Yet, it
would be naive to ignore the fact that a "wireless lie detector" would permit the government
to conduct extensive surreptitious surveillance of the general citizenry.
Other forms of such "wireless" detectors are being developed at the present time.
These include the retinoscope, which purports to detect deception by examining changes in
the subject's retina; the microwave respiration monitor; and another form of voice
analyzer, the Mark II. See Moorhead Hearings at 112-140, 394-405.
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and Security, Inc. (Dektor) of Springfield, Virginia. 6 This latest
development in lie detection is premised on the thesis that psycho-
logical stress is detectable through identification and measurement of
physiological changes in the human voice.
Claims made by the manufacturer suggest a multiplicity of uses
for the PSE, including employment applicant screening, periodic
testing of employees as a check on theft, and investigation of criminal
suspects by both private and public employers as well as law enforce-
ment agencies. 7 Dektor itself has suggested that the PSE can aid both
the psychiatrist, in distinguishing "fact from fancy" in patient state-
ments; and the physician, in diagnosing brain damage in new-borns.8
More importantly, unlike the polygraph, the PSE is operative in both
overt and covert testing situations, 9 since it need not be physically
attached to the subject. As a corollary to this, Dektor has stated in
its literature that a test could be administered over the telephone. 10
And if this be the case, it is quite possible that stress level determina-
tions could be made of voices originating on either television or radio.1
Although Dektor has emphasized the fact that a rigid test proce-
dure is mandatory in effectively evaluating veracity, 12 an analysis
of the variety of uses for which the PSE is propounded evinces the
likelihood of its use for truth evaluation by an assortment of indi-
viduals too inadequately trained to adhere to such rigid procedures.
Moreover, the major institutional value of the PSE is not so much its
potential for use in detecting whether a subject is telling the truth
in the context of a dialogue,1 3 but rather the relative ease with which
6 Dektor's specializations, as represented on its stationery, are research and development of
counterintelligence and security equipment; design, fabrication and installation of special
requirement security and alarm equipment; clandestine listening countermeasures surveys
and equipment; and consultation in special security problems. See Moorhead Hearings
at 242.
7 See DAHM, STUDY OF THE FIELD USE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR, in
Moorhead Hearings at 255-267 [hereinafter cited as DAHM STUDY].
8 SHATTUCK, BROWN & CARLSON, ACLU REPORTS: THE LIE DETECTOR AS A SURVEIL-
LANCE DEVICE 64 (1973), in Moorhead Hearings at 73 [hereinafter cited as ACLU
REPORTS].
'Testimony of Charles R. McQuiston, Senior Vice President, Dektor, in Moorhead Hearings
at 359 [hereinafter cited as McQuiston Testimony].
"oSee generally Testimony of Charles R. McQuiston, Senior Vice President, Dektor, and John
W. Heisse, Jr., M.D., President, International Society of Stress Analysts, in Moorhead
Hearings at 313 et seq.
11 "[T]he AM-FM range that is measured by the PSE-1 reproduced satisfactorily in recordings
made from telephone conversations, radio and television ..... ACLU REPORTS, supra
note 8, at 63-4, in Moorhead Hearings at 72-3.
12 DEKTOR, USE OF LIE DETECTORS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13 (1974), in Moor-
head Hearings at 236 [hereinafter cited as DEKTOR REPORT].
13 This potential for use is already becoming a reality. In 1973, George O'Toole, a former
computer specialist for the CIA, performed PSE tests on recordings of Lee Harvey Oswald's
(Continued on next page)
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the device can be employed for this purpose. The foregoing, coupled
with the fact that the PSE may be used without the knowledge of
the subject, suggests frightening possibilities for its abuse.
With this in mind, this note will examine the manner in which
the PSE functions and explore the legal implications steming from
its use as a lie detector. More specifically, three issues which arise
in connection with the use of the PSE will be discussed: first, the
validity and reliability of the PSE; second, the admissibility of PSE
test results in evidence; and third, the potential remedies for sub-
jects of PSE tests who have occasion to object.
Background
The PSE itself merely indicates levels of stress in the voice,
while the examiner interprets this data and so derives a conclusion
concerning the truthfulness of the subject. Because of this dichotomy,
PSE advocates argue that the term "lie detector" is a misnomer,
preferring instead to emphasize the concept of "stress analysis. ' ' "4 The
fact remains, however, that the PSE is not marketed as a device
which measures the stress of the subject merely for the sake of
curiosity. Rather, PSE customers are interested in using the machine
solely for the purpose of detecting false statements. Consequently,
the term "lie detector" is hardly misleading.
While the polygraph utilizes responses stimulated by the auto-
nomic nervous system, 15 the functional indicators of the PSE originate
in the central nervous system. 16 In order to more fully understand the
technology underlying the PSE, some explanation of the functioning
of the human voice is necessary.
Two types of sound are produced by the voice. The first of these
is audible sound (AM), which is produced by both the vibration
of the vocal cords (vocal cord sounds) and the resonance of the
(Continued from preceding page)
voice when he was asked by reporters if he had killed President John F. Kennedy.
Specifically, O'Toole analyzed two of Oswald's responses to questions about his involve-
ment in the assassination: "No, I have not been charged with that [killing the President],"
and "I didn't shoot anybody, no sir." O'Toole's conclusion that the PSE analysis
revealed Oswald did not commit the crime was confirmed by Mike Kradz, Dektor's
Director of Training, and Lloyd H. Hitchcock, a well-known polygraph and PSE expert,
while Gordan Barland, author of the Barland Study, infra note 35, concluded that Oswald
"probably" had not shot anyone. O'Toole, Lee Harvey Oswald Was Innocent, PENTHOUSE,
April 1975, at 45.
14 DEKTOR REPORT supra note 12, at 4, in Moorhead Hearings at 227.
s The autonomic nervous system is
that portion of the nervous system which innervates internal organs, sweat
and sebaceous glands in the skin, blood vessels and muscles around the pupil
of the eye. It is divided into a parasympathetic division and a sympathetic
division. These nerves are connected to and regulated by the CNS [Central
Nervous System] but at a subconscious level.
C. MONTGOMERY, MEDICAL DESK MANUAL FOR LAW OFFICES 111 (1967).
16 Statement of John W. Heisse, Jr., M.D., President, International Society of Stress Analysts
(ISSA), in Moorhead Hearings at 342 [hereinafter cited as Heisse Statement].
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cavities of the head (formant sounds). The second type of sound is
inaudible sound, which is superimposed on the audible voice fre-
quency.17 The latter is an infrasonic frequency modulation (FM)
which is present in both the vocal cord and formant sounds. This
infrasonic frequency is produced by a muscle micro-tremor le which
occurs in the muscles controlling exhalation during the vocalization
response. 19
The operation of the PSE rests on the theory that this tremor is
affected by stress. Muscular tension decreases or eliminates the
muscular undulations which produce the frequency modulation, thus
dampening the inaudible frequency modulation (FM) in the voice. 20
Hence, "[t] he strength and pattern of the . . . [FM in the voice]
relate inversely to the degree of stress in the speaker at the moment
of the utterance." 21
The PSE applies this theory by identifying changes in the fre-
quency modulation of the voice and emitting data reflecting these
changes. To utilize this operation in a lie detector context, a four-
part system is employed: the examiner; a tape recorder; the test
subject; and the PSE instrument itself.2 2 This instrument produces
a strip chart, not unlike that provided by a polygraph. The PSE,
however, uses a single stylus instead of the three found on a poly-
graph, and while there is but one stylus, the electronic mode combina-
tions allow thirty-two individual charts to be made from every re-
corded statement.23
The procedure in a PSE examination necessarily varies with the
purpose for which the system is used, 24 but a procedural model has
been developed by PSE expert, Morton Sinks, which aptly illustrates
the usual deception testing situation :25
17 G. SMITH, ANALYSIS OF THE VOICE 2 (1973), in Moorhead Hearings at 269 [hereinafter
cited as SMITH].
18 Lippold, Physiological Tremor, SC. AM., March 1971, at 65. Dr. Heisse, President of ISSA,
refers to this as the "micro-muscle" tremor. Heisse Statement supra note 16, at 23, in
Moorhead Hearings at 339.
19 J. WORTH & B. LEWIS, AN EARLY VALIDATION STUDY WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS
EVALUATOR (1974), in Moorhead Hearings at 285 [hereinafter cited as WORTH &
LEWIS STUDY).
20 DEKTOR REPORT supra note 12, at Annex A (Description, Patent Information: Psycho-
logical Stress Evaluator), in Moorhead Hearings at 238.
21 SMITH supra note 17, at 2, in Moorhead Hearings at 269.
2 Testimony of John W. Heisse, Jr., M.D., President, ISSA, in Moorhead Hearings at 350.
23 McQuiston Testimony, supra note 9, in Moorhead Hearings at 354. One of these channels
of information on the PSE is an expiratory pneumogram similar to a channel of the
polygraph. Testimony of John W. Heisse, Jr., M.D., President, ISSA, in Moorhead Hearings
at 354.
24 The various studies on PSE validity discussed infra reflect this difference in format. See
text accompanying footnotes 32-80.
25M. Sinks, The Psychological Stress Evaluator 2 (1974) (unpublished study available
at The Cleveland State Law Library).
[Vol. 24:299
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(1) The pre-test interview: basic information about the
subject is elicited, preliminary interview questions are formu-
lated and the statement the subject will make during the test
is structured;
(2) Input: the questions are asked;
(3) Data retrieval: a tape recording is made of the subject's
answers;
(4) Charting: the subject's oral answers are electronically
converted by the PSE into mechanical motion producing
measurable differences on a chart;
(5) Interpretation of the charts: the charts are analyzed for
indications of stress, relative values are assigned to the re-
sponses, and conclusions as to deception are made;
(6) Follow-up: consists of either the elimination of suspicion
or further investigation, interviewing or interrogation.
Because of the system's dependence upon the examiner for accurate
test results, the training of a PSE examiner is of great importance.
Dektor requires that all prospective purchasers undergo training,
and in fact has reportedly refused to sell to customers who would not
take the training course. 26 The Orientation Course is the basic course
in the operation of the instrument and instruction in interpretation of
strip charts. It lasts three days, with out-of-classroom work for the
intervening two nights.27 Also available to the customer is a con-
tinuous consultation service, and if necessary, retraining. Further,
there is a two-week course available, in which the particular type of
interrogation and interviewing techniques necessary for the valid
operation of the PSE are taught.
With this digest of general information about the PSE as a back-
drop, the remainder of this note will focus on the legal issues which
arise from the use of the PSE as a technique of truth vertification.
Validity and Reliability of the PSE
If the PSE is to have any value within the context of the legal
system, it must be demonstrated that it is possible to detect deception
both consistently and correctly by examination of the strip chart
results of the PSE. To make such a determination, the concepts of
"validity" and "reliability" must be addressed. Although these terms
are often used interchangeably by laymen, each is a distinct concept.
Validity is the determination of how well the instrument does what
26 Moorhead Hearings at 229.
2 Id. at 230. Army polygraph training is 14 weeks long with an internship requirement
before certification is granted. See Statement of Robert Brisentine, Jr., Senior Polygraph
Examiner, U.S. Army, in Moorhead Hearings at 557.
19751
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it purports to do,28 or in this case, "the extent to which a deceptive..
person will be identified ... as a result of the examination. ' 29 On the
other hand, in evaluating the reliability of an instrument, the inquiry
is whether the instrument does what it does with repeatable consis-
tency,30 or does the PSE get the same results - whether correct or not
- each time the test is given. 31
Validity
The primary consideration in this regard is whether the PSE
test is valid.32 In view of the fact that the machine itself only indi-
cates stress on the chart and that in turn the chart must be inter-
preted by the examiner prior to a determination of deception, this
discussion must necessarily take an examiner-machine systemic
approach.33
The question of PSE validity is simply framed: whether or not
the PSE does in fact measure stress; and if it does, whether or not
any examiner can isolate deception-induced stress, as opposed to that
associated with anxiety, nervous tension, or some other source. There
have been several empirical studies attempting to resolve this issue.
A brief elucidation of their results should illustrate the status of the
PSE.
Three studies have drawn positive conclusions on this issue, those
by Kradz,34 Barland,3 5 and Worth and Lewis. 36 The Kradz Study was
conducted in 1972 by Michael Kradz, while he was Chief Polygraph
2 L. PERVIN, PERSONALITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH 76 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as PERVIN].
29 G. BARLAND, THE RELIABILITY OF POLYGRAPH CHART EVALUATIONS, IN LEGAL AD-
MISSIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 120 (N. Ansely ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
BARLAN.].
30 PERVIN, supra note 28, at 73.
31 BARLAND, supra note 29.
32 It has been asserted that the PSE is not only as valid as the polygraph but can also be
used in those situations where the polygraph is ineffective because the PSE does not
require that the subject be attached to the instrument. M. KRADZ, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
244-45 [hereinafter cited as KRADZ STUDY]. Cf. Heisse statementM ..... M m....- m__-_ M.__
STRESS EVALUATOR: A STUDY 1-2 (1972), in Moorhead Hearings at 244-45 [hereinafter
cited as KRADZ STUDY]. Cf. Heisse statement supra note 16, 29-3 1, in Moorhead Hearings
at 345-47; discussion at note 5 supra.
33 As the Dektor Report noted, "[I)t must be recognized that this method of establishing
validity and reliability is a system evaluation, rather than component evaluation. Ultimately,
this is what is important. It is the system in its entirely to which the examinee is sub-
jected." DEKTOR REPORT supra note 12, at 6, in Moorhead Hearings at 229.
34KRADZ STUDY, supra note 32, in Moorhead Hearings at 244.
3 5 G. BARLAND, USE OF VOICE CHANGES IN DETECTION OF DECEPTION (1973), in Moor-
head Hearings at 283 (Abstract) [hereinafter cited as BARLAND STUDY).
36 WORTH & LEWIS STUDY, supra note 19, in Moorhead Hearings at 284. For other validity
studies, which were submitted for the record but did not deal with use in determining
deception, see SMITH, supra note 17, in Moorhead Hearings at 268; M. BRENNER, STAGE-
FRIGHT AND STEVENS' LAW (1974), in Moorhead Hearings at 279.
[Vol. 24:299
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Examiner for the Howard County, Maryland, Police Department.3 7
The experiment used 43 actual criminal suspects who were given
simultaneous polygraph and PSE tests. The results indicated that
the PSE test was 100 % accurate in detecting deception as corroborated
by independent investigation.3
8
The Barland Study, conducted by Gordon Barland tested two
groups, one in a low-stress situation and the other in a high-stress
situation. While the PSE detection rate in the low-stress group was
on par with chance,
under the high stress condition, using polygraph responses
as the criterion for stress, voice changes were clearly able to
distinguish between truth and deception. 39
The third favorable study was co-authored by James W. Worth
and Bernard J. Lewis of Washington and Lee University, in 1973.
Like the Barland Study, it was conducted in a laboratory rather than
"in the field." This experiment involved 12 subjects in a wagering
situation and revealed that, although the PSE did not perform suc-
cessfully on the first trial, on the second trial the examiner successfully
identified deceptive responses.40 Worth and Lewis concluded that
the PSE is a promising research tool, although "more scrutiny is
needed to establish the limits of its capabilities. 41
In contrast, the only study which was conducted both on a large
scale and independent of the manufacturer reached clearly unfavor-
able conclusions regarding the validity of the PSE. The Kubis Report
was prepared under a contract with the Army Land Warfare Labora-
tory.42 Dr. Joseph Kubis, the author, had previously conducted ex-
periments on the polygraph culminating in the widely discussed Kubis
Report on the Polygraph in 1962.
43
17 Michael Kradz is now Director of Training for Dektor.
' KRADZ STUDY, supra note 32, in Moorhead Hearings at 249. The independent corrobora-
tion was as follows:
27 subjects cleared of suspicion by PSE:
21- innocence corroborated by independent investigation,
6 - subjects released because no evidence to contrary.
16 subjects not cleared by PSE:
9- guilt corroborated by investigation, with subsequent admission,
3 - by investigation, without admission,
4 - by admission of guilt and subsequent investigation.
39 BARLAND STUDY, supra note 35, in Moorhead Hearings at 283.
40 WORTH & LEWIS STUDY, supra note 19, in Moorhead Hearings at 285.
41 Id.
42J. KUBIS, COMPARISON OF VOICE ANALYSIS AND POLYGRAPH AS LIE DETECTION
PROCEDURES (1973), in Moorhead Hearings at 503 [hereinafter cited as KUBIS REPORT).
43See, e.g., M. Orne, R. Thackray & D. Paskewitz, On the Detection of Deception, in HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 743, 757 (Greenfield & Sternbach eds. 1972); M. Orne,
Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Deception, in LEGAL ADMISSI-
BILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 111 (N. Ansley ed. 1975); Validity Panel, in LEGAL ADMIS-
SIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 163 (N. Ansley ed. 1975).
1975]
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The express purpose of the Kubis study was to evaluate the
capability of voice analysis as a lie detection technique." PSE results
were compared with polygraph results, as well as judgments based on
observation of the verbal and non-verbal behavior of 174 subjects.
The structure of the experiment was a "simulated theft" paradigm,
45
in which examiner determination of deception was made by both
individual and triad analysis.4"
The results of the Kubis study revealed that the PSE failed to
demonstrate effectiveness in detection of deception in a laboratory
situation.47 When the PSE examiner used the individual analytic mode,
the results were an embarrassing 33% ,4 which, in the context of
the experiment, were virtually the same as chance. The results were
also disappointing under triad analysis: a meager 19% accuracy
score when the PSE and polygraph were operated simultaneously,
49
and 53% for tests conducted when only the PSE was used.50 But the
Tape Monitors, individuals charged with the responsibility of monitor-
ing the taping equipment and observing the subjects' behavior during
the test, made their evaluations of deception only on their immediate
global impressions and scored an amazing 89 % .51
On the basis of this data Dr. Kubis concluded that the PSE can-
not be "accepted as a valid 'lie detector' within the constraints of an
experimental paradigm."52
KUBIS REPORT, supra note 42, at 1, in Moorhead Hearings at 508. This study also tested
the Voice Stress Analyzer and made the same basic conclusions with regard to this device.
's In the simulated theft paradigm the group of 174 Fordham University students in the
experiment was first divided into groups of three (triads). Two members of each triad
were separated from the third and drew lots to take the role of Thief or Lookout in the
following scenario. The Theif was instructed to enter an unoccupied office, examine
the contents of a woman's purse lying on a desk there and remove a change purse con-
taining twenty-one dollars around which a red ribbon had been wrapped. The Lookout,
although he accompanied the Thief to the office, was unaware of what was stolen. The
third member of the triad took the role of Innocent Suspect, and was told only that there
had been a theft of some money in an office. He also was told to answer all questions
truthfully while the Thief and Lookout were to deny all involvement with the theft.
Each member of the triad was instructed to give a "yes" or "no" answer to a questionnaire
of 30 questions. KUBIS REPORT, supra note 42, at 8-9, in Moorhead Hearings at 514-15.
46 In triad analysis, the rater has the records of all three members of the triad before him for
comparison. If he correctly identifies who played two of the roles, he necessarily will
correctly identify the third member's role. In individual analysis, on the other hand, the
judgment as to subject involvement is made by the rater on the basis of the strip chart
of that record alone. Id. at 13, in Moorhead Hearings at 519.
47 Id. at iii, in Moorhead Hearings at 505.
4 Id. at 23, in Moorhead Hearings at 529.
49Id. at 24, in Moorhead Hearings at 530.
50Id.
51 Id. at 25, in Moorhead Hearings at 531.
52 Id. at 33, in Moorhead Hearings at 539.
[Vol. 24 :299
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In response to this report, Dektor prepared a position paper
entitled The Kubis Report of 1978: An Invalid Study,5 3 which was
submitted for the record of the Hearings conducted by the Foreign
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee on June 4-5,
1974.5 This paper attacked the Kubis Report on three major grounds:
(1) that the government contract objectives were not met by the
study; (2) that several required specifications of that contract were
not reported in the report Kubis submitted; and (3) that the Kubis
Report per se was scientifically invalid because of insufficient variable
control in the experiments. 55
The first of these allegations was based on Dektor's view that
the contract required the study to be conducted in as realistic a setting
as possible. 56 In their opinion, actual criminal suspects should have
been employed in the experiment so as to heighten the stress situation.
They further criticized the type of questions used in the interrogation,
as well as the use of triad analysis in determining deception,5 7 because
such analysis is not utilized in an actual examination.
Their second ground of attack was founded on the absence of
certain data in the report which the contract had specified for inclu-
sion.5 8 They were particularly disturbed that the PSE and the poly-
graph were not operated simultaneously in every trial of the experi-
ment. Moreover, they charged that some of the PSE tapes were of
such poor quality that they could not be evaluated.
Finally Dektor attacked the very validity of the study itself on
the grounds of insufficient control of the variables.59 The company
cited, inter alia, the lack of control questions to establish stress induced
by deception only, and the failure to eliminate or avoid emotion-
producing words in the questions, as is done in an actual test.60
Further, Dektor contended that the Kubis experiment failed to pro-
vide for an adequate evaluation of the reliability of the PSE since
only one examiner was involved in the PSE analysis, whereas several
3 DEKTOR, THE KUBIS REPORT OF 1973: AN INVALID STUDY, in Moorhead Hearings at
301 [hereinafter cited as DEKTOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS].
s4 Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies Before the
the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
55 DEKTOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 53, in Moorhead Hearings at 301.
6 Id. at 1, in Moorhead Hearings at 301.
5 This type of analysis is neither realistic or possible to the real polygraph examiner,
who in any investigation of a group of three suspects involved in a single
crime, is faced with the fact of ten possible combinations of criminals, accomplices,
and/or innocents.
Id. at 2, in Moorhead Hearings at 302 (emphasis in original).
W d. at 2-3, in Moorhead Hearings at 302-3.
59 Id. at 3, in Moorhead Hearings at 303.
60 Id.
1975]
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polygraph experts evaluated each polygram. 6 1 Based on the foregoing,
Dektor concluded that it was entitled to restitution in the form of a
public declaration of the lack of validity of the Kubis Report.62
Dr. Kubis, addressing the attack launched by Dektor against his
study, has indicated that he stands steadfast on his original conclusion
that the PSE has not been demonstrated to possess the necessary scien-
tific validity.63
In responding to Dektor's first allegation that contract objectives
were not met, Dr. Kubis defended his use of triad analysis in the ex-
periment on the grounds that this mode of analysis had the advantages
of being "simple," "complete," and "readily analyzable."'64 As to Dek-
tor's criticism that he should have used actual criminal suspects, he
responded, "Over the past 20 years, lie detection research at Fordham
has been done with non-criminal suspects. This is well known in the
field and was, of course, known by the contracting agency. ' 65 He fur-
ther listed what he believed to be "insurmountable difficulties" that
the use of criminal suspects presented in the experimental environ-
ment, among them the fact that there were too many variables in the
suspects themselves and the crimes committed to make such an experi-
ment valid, as well as the difficulty in establishing proof of accuracy
of the test in such a situation.66
Moreover, it is Dr. Kubis' contention that his report met all con-
tract specifications as well. 67 He stated that there was no requirement
that each subject be tested on both the PSE and polygraph, and ex-
plained that some subjects were tested only by the former because it
was suspected that the polygraph attachment may have inhibited the
voice records.68 As to Dektor's charge that the tapes were of inferior
61 Dektor further asserted in this regard that
when the question structure was shown to the expert examiner who had been
selected for the voice analysis part of the study, he refused to participate and
resigned from the study.
Id. The PSE expert to which Dektor referred was Mike Kradz, author of the Kradz Study;
he was replaced by Gordon Barland, author of the Barland Study.
62 Id. at 4, in Moorhead Hearings at 304.
63 Letter from Joseph F. Kubis, July 22, 1974, on file in The Cleveland State Law Library.
Accompanying this letter was a report Dr. Kubis prepared in response to Dektor's charges.
This report, Comments of I. F. Kubis on the Dektor Report, is also on file in the law
library [hereinafter cited as KUBIS COMMENTS].
64 KUBIS COMMENTS, supra note 63 at 2.
65 Id.
"Id. at 2-3.
67 Id. at 4.
6a This concern appears to have been borne out by the results of the Kubis experiment: the
results from testing by PSE alone indicated 53% accuracy while combined polygraph-PSE
tests resulted in 19% accuracy. See notes 48-51 supra, and accompanying text.
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quality, Dr. Kubis responded that this had no effect on the study since
the PSE expert was asked to analyze only those records which he felt
he could confidently rate.69
Dr. Kubis responded to Dektor's charge of the invalidity of the
study itself by noting that the questionnaire which was used in the
experiment had previously been found to be "completely adequate for
experimental work." °7 0 Moreover, he stood behind the choice to use only
one PSE examiner by asserting that the issue should be only "how
accurate and expert the rater or examiner is. ''71 It should also be noted
that elsewhere Dr. Kubis explained his difficulty in obtaining a PSE
examiner to participate in the study ;72 the one expert that was used
was Gordon Barland, an established PSE and polygraph expert and
the author of the Barland Study.7 3
Dr. Kubis concluded his comments on the Dektor paper by counter-
charging that it "manifests a surprising scientific naivete or a selective
distortion of the facts as presented in the Kubis report. ' 74 Finally, he
emphasized that "the records in the Kubis experiment were analyzed
by an expert in the Dektor technique using a Dektor instrument. This
man, Dr. Barland, was trained and certified at the Dektor training cen-
ter. He is also an outstanding investigator in the field of lie detection.
75
The most recent study on validity of the PSE, the Dahm Study,
was undertaken by Dektor in preparation for the Hearings before the
House Subcommittee. 76 A survey of 423 PSE customers sought to es-
tablish its validity in actual field use. A total of 39,329 PSE tests were
reported by the 46 customers who responded, a substantial number of
which were simultaneous polygraph and PSE tests.77 Insofar as the
69 KUBIS COMMENTS, supra note 63, at 5.
7 1d. at 6.
71 Id. at 7.
72 According to Dr. Kubis, Mike Kradz initially indicated his willingness to take part in
the study and then asked to be relieved of his obligation; but at no time
did he state that the questionnaire structure used in the project was invalid
or that it was the reason for his resignation from the project. If he had such
thoughts, he was not honest in his dealings with me. I suspect he may have
developed these thoughts after he learned of the results of the Kubis study
and the search for a rebuttal began.
Id. at4.
73 See BARLAND STUDY, supra note 35, in Moorhead Hearings at 283.
74 KUBIS COMMENTS, supra note 63, at 7.
7 1 Id. at 8.
76 DAHM STUDY, supra note 7, in Moorhead Hearings at 255.
77 Id. at 3 in Moorhead Hearings at 257. Fifteen examiners had conducted 5,579 simultaneous
polygraph and PSE tests; Dektor reported that five of these examiners
did not indicate the degree of correlation between the two instruments. The
remaining ten accounted for 5,045 examinations. Of these, the two instruments
resulted in the same findings in 5,037 cases, for 99.85% correlation.
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confirmation of deception conclusions were concerned, the study indi-
cated that every PSE examination had been accurate, although only
twenty percent of these were independently corroborated. 78
Several comments are in order regarding this study. Dektor can
hardly be considered a disinterested party in the controversy over the
validity of the PSE, especially in light of the furor generated by the
Kubis Report. Moreover, the simultaneous polygraph-PSE test is
tainted from the presence of too many variables in the study. In this
testing situation, as with the Barland and Kradz studies,79 the same
examiner would likely have been interpreting charts from both ma-
chines, as well as having the benefit of observing the subject's behavior
during the examination. As the Kubis Report revealed, the latter fac-
tor can be significant in detecting deception. In addition, it is suggested
that the PSE examiner has a vested interest in obtaining identical re-
sults from the two lie detectors.
As for the confirmation statistics, only the twenty percent figure
can be deemed at all significant; the mere fact that the examiners did
not later learn of their mistakes does not mean that mistakes were not
made. Furthermore, the significance of even this figure is suspect, since
where corroboration was reported, no explanation of its nature was
provided. Consequently, rather than resolving the controversy over the
validity of the PSE, the Dahm Study has added little more than con-
fusion.
The dialogue between Dektor and Dr. Kubis has proven instructive
in the sense that a number of the issues which will be hotly debated
in future years have been clearly drawn: who should conduct the ex-
periments on the PSE; what form should the experimentation take to
fairly test the PSE; and where should validity studies be conducted,
in laboratory or in actual testing situations. No doubt other issues will
develop as further study is made of this new device.
Reliability
A discussion of reliability focuses on two components of the PSE,
the instrument and the examiner. Instrument reliability is provided
by internal calibration signal circuitry which affords almost instan-
taneous recalibration in an actual testing situation.8 0 As such, the re-
liability of the examiner in his role as interpreter of the strip charts
presents the far more important issue.
71 Id. Nineteen respondents indicated that
of the 10,202 examinations conducted, they reported not one case in which the
findings of the PSE examination had been inaccurate. Additionally . . . 2,285
examinations, or over 20% of those reported, were corroborated independently.
11 BARLAND STUDY, supra note 35, in Moorhead Hearings at 283; KRADZ STUDY, supra note
32, in Moorhead Hearings at 244.
80 DEKTOR REPORT, supra note 12, at 7, in Moorhead Hearings at 230.
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Examiner reliability is essentially the probability of identical con-
clusions being drawn by several individual analysts when interpreting
a given set of strip charts. Recognizing that the machine itself merely
registers stress, with reliance placed entirely upon the examiner to
isolate deception related stress, it is surprising that the furor over
the validity of the PSE has not carried over to the issue of examiner
reliability.
Moreover, the seriousness of this issue is highlighted when the
revelations of the Kubis Report are examined. Dr. Kubis found that
success at perceiving deception is significantly affected by mere ob-
servation of the subject's behavior during the course of interrogation.
To be sure, concern over examiner subjectivity is not limited to the
PSE; criticism of this nature has long been directed towards the poly-
graph.81 Nevertheless, the mere fact that the issue is not peculiar to
the PSE will not dispose of the problem. Rather, in light of the short
training program afforded the PSE examiner,8 2 the problem is magni-
fied to the point where skepticism toward examiner reliability may
be well founded.
The manufacturer, in response to the reliability issue, has utilized
two divergent procedures in attempting to minimize possible adverse
effects. On the one hand, through a consultation service, it provides its
customers with corroboration in the interpretation of charts.8 3 On the
other, it has expended considerable time and effort in lobbying for
state licensing of PSE examiners.84
It is highly questionable whether these efforts will be sufficient.
Rather, the need for additional independent research in this area is
appallingly evident. Until such time as the scientific basis for the PSE
has been established through further research, a healthy skepticism
of its results is clearly warranted.
Admissibility in Evidence of PSE Results
The analysis of whether results of a PSE examination should be
deemed admissible in evidence in a legal proceeding will entail consid-
eration of the following five issues:
(1) the PSE as a new type of scientific evidence;
(2) PSE tests result as hearsay;
(3) the conflict between the sixth amendment and the PSE;
(4) the effect of the PSE on the integrity of the judicial
process; and
(5) the weight to be accorded the PSE.
81 See, e.g., Statement submitted by Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) for record of Moorhead
Hearings at 785 [hereinafter cited as Sen. Ervin's Statement].
82 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
3 DEKTOR REPORT, supra note 12, at 7, in Moorhead Hearings at 230.
8 See, e.g., Proposed Florida Senate Bill 571, attached to Exhibit B to Answers of Charles
R. McQuiston to Moorhead Committee Question 7, in Moorhead Hearings at 366.
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Scientific Evidence
The term "scientific evidence" has apparently never been given a
legal definition. For purposes of this discussion the term will refer to
that evidence derived from an instrument which purports to be con-
structed on scientific principles which will aid the trier of fact in
evaluating credibility.85 Obviously, this type of evidence has assumed
a greater role in the legal system as technology has advanced. At one
time when the courts confronted scientific evidence, they employed the
traditional test of admissibility for an expert witness, i.e., (1) the
subject of the testimony had to be of a. nature beyond the knowledge
of the average layman; and (2) the witness had to possess sufficient
knowledge, skill or experience in that field such that his opinion would
probably aid the trier of fact.86
The special approach now taken with scientific evidence was first
formulated in 1923, in Frye v. United States.87 In order to establish
his innocence in a prosecution for murder, the defendant in Frye had
submitted to a type of lie detector test.88 The trial court sustained the
prosecutor's objection to the testimony of the test administrator and
the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the exclusion of this scientific evi-
dence, and in so doing, promulgated the currently accepted test for
admissibility of scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general scientific acceptance in the field to which it
belongs. 89
The Frye test has not been without its critics. Dean Wigmore pro-
posed an alternative test for dealing with polygraphic evidence which
as Cf., J. WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 450 (3d ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
86 McCORMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. E. Cleary, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK'S).
87293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
8 The Marston deception test was one of the earliest lie detectors. It functioned by record-
ing the subject's systolic blood pressure during interrogation. R. FERGUSON & A. MILLER,
THE POLYGRAPH IN COURT 37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FERGUSON & MILLER).
89293 F. at 1016. Ironically, the defendant had served three years of a life sentence when
another person confessed to the crime. NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOURTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT. 265 (1948), in FERGUSON & MILLER, supra note 88, at 27.
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strongly resembles the traditional expert witness rule,90 while Pro-
fessor McCormick suggested the test requires the proposed evidence
to meet a higher standard than is proper:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition upon
the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not
as a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.9 1
Be that as it may, the Frye test has long since been accepted by
nearly all courts when addressing the admissibility of a wide variety
of scientific evidence. 92 Two specific types of scientific evidence are
particularly analogous to the PSE and thus relevant to an analysis of
whether the PSE should or will be given judicial approval.
The first is spectrographic evidence, or a voice spectrogram pro-
duced by a spectrograph machine, being essentially a graphic record
of the human voice.9 3 For spectrographic analysis the subject's voice
is recorded and the patterns are transferred onto a spectrogram for
analysis. The spectrograph is founded upon the theory that, like finger-
prints, no two human voice patterns are identical.9 4
A survey of the admissibility status of the spectrograph reveals
its growing acceptance by the courts. As one commentator observed,
while the lie detector continues to struggle for acceptance as
criminal evidence, voiceprint analysis is gradually settling
into a comfortable slot in the forensic science arsenal.95
Though voice identification by ear has been acceptable in some juris-
dictions for a number of years, 96 the turning point in admissibility of
the spectrograph in state courts came in 1972 when the Supreme Court
" Dean Wigmore proposed a three-pronged approach to admissibility of scientific evidence:
A. The type of apparatus purporting to be constructed on scientific principles
must be accepted as dependable for the proposed purpose by the profession con-
cerned in that branch of science or its related art. This can be evidenced by
qualified expert testimony; or, if notorious, it will be judicially noticed by the
judge without evidence.
B. The particular apparatus used by the witness must be one constructed accord-
ing to an accepted type and must be in good condition for accurate work.
This may be evidenced by a qualified expert.
C. The witness using the apparatus as a source of his testimony must be one
qualified for its use by training and experience.
WIGMORE, supra note 85, at 450.
9' MCCORMICK's, supra note 86, at § 203.
92 See Lindsey v. United States, 16 Alas. 268, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956) (sodium
pentothal test); Jordan v. Mace, 145 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) (blood grouping tests
for paternity); People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949) (chemical
intoxication tests).
"United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 642 (D.D.C. 1972). For a general discussion
of spectrographic evidence, see Jones, Danger- Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AMER. CRIM.
L. REV. 549 (1973); Note, Voiceprints, 61 GEo. L.J. 703 (1973); Note, The Voiceprint
Technique: A Problem in Scientific Evidence, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1365 (1972).
4 Note, Voiceprint Identification: The Trend Towards Admissibility, 9 NEW ENG. L.R. 419,
424 (1974).
9 In the Courts, 13 CRIM. L. RPT. 2197, 2203 (1973).
96 See cases cited in Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 995 (1960).
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of Minnesota held in State ex. rel. Trimble v. Hedman,97 that voice-
prints were admissible to corroborate voice identification by ear.
Simultaneously, two appellate courts in Florida ruled favorably on the
admissibility of this type of evidence ;98 while the New Jersey Supreme
Court suggested it might reconsider its prior negative stance on the
issue. 9
In the federal court system, a government motion to admit spectro-
graphic evidence was granted by the District Court of the District of
Columbia in United States v. Raymond. 0 0 But the court of appeals per
Judge McGowen concluded that the spectrograph was not yet suffi-
ciently accepted by the scientific community as a whole and thus held
admission of such evidence to be erroneous. 10 1 The absence of further
rulings on the issue by federal appellate courts, however, precludes as
premature any conclusions as to the future of the spectrograph in the
federal system.
The second type of scientific evidence relevant to this analysis is
that occasioned through the use of the polygraph. The treatment ac-
corded the polygraph by the courts has been rather cavalier. Judicially
sustained resistance to its acceptance has been so widespread as to
elicit the response from one commentator that the courts are looking
for infallibility of the technique before according their approval.102
Until very recently, the admissibility status of the results of lie
detectors as a whole and polygraphs in particular had changed little
since Frye. In his 1953 review of the polygraph's status, Dean Wicker
noted that nearly all the courts which had confronted the issue
parrot [ed] the language of the Frye case of 1923 and [gave]
as the principal reason for excluding test results that they
have not yet gained such standing and recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made. 103
It is only within the last few years that the sea has begun to part.
97291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1972).
9Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613
(Fla. Ct. App. 1972).
"State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972).
100 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
10 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (decision affirmed because admissibility of spectrographic
evidence did not require reversal in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt).
102 F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES
§ 379 (1970).
103 Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Laws of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711,
723 (1953).
[Vol. 24:299
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/6
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR
By and large, the extent to which the courts have permitted poly-
graph test results to enter the judicial process has been limited to ad-
mission under stipulation. In 1948, the Supreme Court of California
in People v. Hauser,10 4 became the first court to grant such admissible
status. Since that time a growing minority of jurisdictions have fol-
lowed this lead. 10 5
The State of Ohio recently joined these ranks in State v. Towns,10 6
when the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that
where parties stipulate in writing to take a polygraph test
and be bound thereby and where pursuant to such stipulation
such test is properly given, the results are admissible at
trial.107
In a significant departure from prior case law, however, the court
went on to state that
where evidence is introduced by one side that a person has
submitted to a lie detector test, the court in its sound discre-
tion may admit evidence of the results of the test, to the ex-
tent necessary to remove prejudice which may ensue from
the introduction of the original evidence.1 08
With this statement the court apparently extended the reach of the
admissibility standard to include situations wherein prejudice would
otherwise result.
Recent years have also witnessed the liberalization of several fed-
eral courts in this regard, with court decisions indicating judicial
recognition of results even without stipulation of the parties. The
TenthCircuit was the first to suggest such a holding in United States
v. Wainwright,1 09 where they noted, in denying admission of poly-
graphic evidence, that in a proper case, it would be accepted. Similarly,
Judge Thompson, of the Southern District of California, in United
104 184 Cal. 418, 193 P.2d 937 (Cal. App. 1948).
105 The following jurisdictions permit admissibility by stipulation: Arizona, State v. Valdez,
91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); California, People v. Davis, 270 Cal. App. 2d 841,
76 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969); Florida, Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969);
Illinois, People v. Ports, 74 Il. App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966); Iowa, State v.
McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); Missouri, State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d
507 (Mo. 1968); New Jersey, State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972);
Ohio, State v. Towns, 35 Ohio App. 2d 237, 301 N.E.2d 700 (1973); Utah, State v.
Rowley, 15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126 (1963); Wisconsin, State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis.
2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
106 35 Ohio App. 2d 237, 301 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
107 Id. at 246, 301 N.E.2d at 706-07.
108 Id. at 246, 301 N.E.2d at 707.
10413 F.2d 796 (10th Cit. 1969).
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States v. DeBetham,110 implied in an extensive opinion on the "general
acceptance" question, that it was only prior Ninth Circuit decisions
on the issue that precluded admission of the proffered tests without
stipulation."'
The leading decision on this issue, however, came in October, 1972
in United States v. Ridling,11 2 when the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan per Judge Joiner held that polygraph test results
were admissible at the behest of the defendant provided he would
agree to certain procedural terms. Post-Ridling decisions have divided
on this issue. In a case decided the same year, the District Court for
the District of Columbia, in United States v. Zeiger,11 3 arrived at es-
sentially the same result, only to have the decision overturned by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.11 4 However, in People
v. Cutter,135 a California Superior Court, citing Ridling, substantially
followed its holding.
The foregoing suggests that it is only time which stands between
the polygraph and judicial recognition of its admissibility. Recent de-
cisions in both state and federal courts indicate that it will shortly
reach the stage where it will be deemed to have met the difficult stand-
ard of admissibility for scientific evidence.
Against this background, the present inquiry will assess whether
the PSE can be said to meet the requirements for admissibility of
Frye v. United States, i.e., has the PSE gained "general acceptance
in the particular field to which it belongs"?
The central issue in this regard is the determination as to which
field the PSE belongs. Although Frye enunciated a general test, the
success of the PSE in meeting its criterion will turn on the inter-
pretation of this phrase. Should the courts adopt a narrow interpre-
tation, the PSE is likely to be deemed admissible. Conversely, a broad
interpretation will almost surely prevent its admission.
In considering scientific evidence, several courts have given the
phrase a narrow interpretation. In Huntington v. Crowley,11 6 the court
in ruling on a new blood grouping system, restricted the "field" to
that of "disputed paternity testing." In construing evidence of Nal-
line test results, the court in People v. Williams,11 7 constricted the
110 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
"I Id. at 1391.
112 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
113 350 F. Supp 685 (D.D.C. 1972).
114 United States v. Zeiger, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
115 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2133 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Nov. 6, 1972).
11664 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966).
117 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
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field to "those who would be expected to be familiar with its use."1 18
And in perhaps the narrowest possible interpretation, one court
found the field could consist of but one person.1 19
Conversely, the phrase has often been given a broad construction.
Raymond v. United States1 20 is an excellent illustration. The court,
concerned with spectrographic evidence, noted that the instrument
had not gained acceptance by the "scientific community as a whole."1 2
This approach has seen its most consistent application in the line of
cases dealing with the polygraph. Thus, although polygraphers have
long accepted the general scientific validity and reliability of poly-
graphic evidence, the courts have approached the test globally, focus-
ing on the "general acceptance" aspect. In so doing, they have virtually
ignored the words "particular field to which it belongs," and centered
their determination on how reliable and valid the instrument is con-
sidered to be in the scientific community. Moreover, if any serious
conflict is found to exist, the courts have been inclined to deny
admission.12 2
Thus, the judicial interpretation of the Frye test suggests two
related yet distinct trends which may prove helpful in predicting the
outcome of the PSE admissibility issue. In dealing with the admis-
sibility of lie detection results from the polygraph, the courts have
employed a broad approach, focusing on the general acceptance of
the scientific community as a whole. More importantly, in utilizing
this approach the courts have indicated that, until very recently, the
polygraph had failed to attain such a level of acceptance, resulting
in an inadmissable status.
In view of this stance, it seems unlikely that the PSE will meet
the Frye standard at the present time. In this regard, perhaps the
single most serious problem facing the PSE is the simple fact that
it lacks acceptance even in the limited field of lie detection. While
PSE experts themselves are generous in their praise of the instru-
ment's validity and reliability, the Board of Directors of the American
Polygraph Association (APA) adopted a resolution expressing their
disapproval of "the Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator as the
source of, or a major contributor to a determination of truth or
1 1 Id. at 862.
119Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970)
(one toxicologist who developed a method for detecting succinic acid).
120 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
121 Id. at 642.
12 Nearly all cases dealing with the polygraph reflect this approach. See also United States
v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
where spectrographic evidence was excluded because there was conflicting testimony.
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deception in a meaningful testing situation. ' 123 The APA based their
disappoval on three basic failings. It felt that the PSE fell below the
minimum instrument standards of the polygraph, that examiner
training did not comport with APA requirements, and that the system
offered potential opportunity for the violation of constitutional
rights. 124
Moreover, in the context of a judicial evaluation, the Kubis Report
casts strong doubts on the validity and reliability of the instrument.
And any attempt to offset the adverse results of the Kubis Report with
findings from the more favorable studies is unlikely to shift the
balance in favor of admissibility. An analysis of the interpretation
given the Frye test in polygraph decisions, when taken together with
the strong resemblance the PSE bears to the polygraph, will admit
of no other result.
To date, the PSE has come in contact with the judicial system in
four distinctly different situations. The attitudes of the institutions
involved in these encounters harbor substantial import when assessing
the likelihood of judicial recognition of PSE admissibility.
The first of these situations involved the use of the PSE as an
investigative aid. This use resulted in dismissal of charges by the
state of Maryland in three cases after stipulated PSE tests indicated
the innocence of the defendants.1 25 In an analogous case in the same
state, the defendant pleaded guilty after submitting to a test which
indicated his culpability.1 26 The significance of these cases stems from
the willingness of the state to place such strong reliance on the PSE
results. This is remarkable in light of the relatively short history
of the device and the paucity of empirical evidence substantiating
either its validity or its reliability.
The second such situation again occurred in Maryland, where in
State v. Brooks,127 the defendant had been convicted of murder and
had served seven years of a life sentence. Upon stipulation by the
123 Resolution of August 19, 1973 of the Board of Directors of American Polygraph Association,
submitted for the record by J. Kirk Barefoot, Chairman, Legislative and Law Committee,
American Polygraph Association (APA), in Moorhead Hearings at 218-19 [hereinafter
cited as APA Resolution]. This opposition to the PSE by the APA is obviously quite
distressing to those who advocate its use. They consider the APA's negative stance to be
the result of jealousy over the fact that the PSE works where the polygraph cannot. See,
e.g., Kaiser, The JFK Assassination: Why Congress Should Reopen the Investigation,
ROLLING STONE, April 24, 1975, at 37. Indeed, one PSE expert, Robert W. Cormack,
Executive Vice President of Personnel Security Corp. of Oakbrook, Illinois, has gone so
far as to suggest that "It would appear that opposition of PSE use smacks of possible
conspiracy by some members of the polygraph field to prevent P.S.E. use for their own
self-interest and financial protection." Letter to Col. Charles McQuiston, March 18, 1974.
'
2 APA Resolution, supra note 123, in Moorhead Hearings at 219.
125Srate v. Goodman, Nos. CR 5318, 5319, 5320 (Cir. Ct. Howard County, Md., 1971);
State v. King, No. CR 10271 - 4902 (10th Dist. Ct. Howard County, Md., 1972); State v.
Jackson, Nos. CR 10271 - 5073, - 5074 (19th Dist. Ct. Howard County, Md., 1972).
12 State v. Mills, No. CR 10271 -4934 (10th Dist. Ct. Howard County, Md., 1972).
17No. C8670 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, Md., Jan. 19, 1966).
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state, the defendant was administered a PSE test which indicated that
at worst he was guilty of manslaughter. A subsequent petition to
the governor resulted in the pardon of the defendant. 128 The similarity
of the Maryland situations suggest that it is the state itself which
is enamored of the PSE, as opposed to its courts. Whether this is
justified is doubtful. There appears, however, to be no indication that
other jurisdictions share this feeling.
The third situation occurred where an Ohio trial court ruled
directly on the admissibility of a PSE test.129 The court, in ruling
against its admissibility, applied a standard of "acceptance equivalent
to the polygraph machine in the community."'' 0 While the court was
mistaken in failing to limit inquiry to the scientific community, its
holding suggests that, at a minimum, acceptance by the scientific
community will be necessary before the PSE meets the Frye standards.
The final situation involved two cases with circumstances so
unique as to prompt the courts to admit the results of PSE tests into
evidence. Unlike the direct approach to the issue taken in the Ohio
case, defense counsel in the case of People v. Herm'3 1 was successful
in obtaining admission of PSE evidence by virtue of its having formed
the basis of a psychiatrist's expert testimony relating to the defendant.
Defense counsel recognized the inherent problem with psychiatric
testimony, i.e., the psychiatrist's opinion is dependent upon the
patient's having been truthful in discussing his experiences. The prob-
lem was countered by making available to the doctor the PSE test
results, and he was permitted to testify that the results indicated the
defendant's truthfulness, thus giving credence to the psychiatrist's
professional opinion. In so doing, the results of the PSE test were
admitted into evidence.
In State v. Brummley,132 the defendant submitted to two PSE
tests, both producing results adverse to his case, and subsequently
made a full confession of his involvement in the crime. At both the
hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence and the subsequent
trial, the defendant's counsel attempted to demonstrate the involun-
tariness of the confession by contending that the administration of
the PSE tests created a situation of duress. To support this conten-
tion, detailed evidence of the questions the defendant was asked during
12 Telephone interview with Donald MacIntosh, April 2, 1975. Mr. MacIntosh was the
attorney responsible for setting in motion the events which led to Mr. Brooks' release.
19 State v. Springer, CP No. 10770 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1974).
130 Record at 256, State v. Springer, CP No. 10770 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1974).
131 No. C 32133 (Mun. Ct. West Orange County, Calif., Aug. 5, 1974). Information on this
case provided through telephone interview with Richard A. Caillouette, attorney for the
defendant, April 3, 1975.
' Docket No. 10,199 (5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Parish of West Carroll, La., 1974).
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the test, the manner in which the test was conducted, and the opera-
tions of the PSE itself were introduced. The State responded by
arguing that, since substantial evidence as to the defendant's having
taken the test had been admitted, the PSE test result should be ad-
mitted as well. Defense counsel did not object, and the judge agreed,
in the interest of fairness, to admit the inculpatory test results. 133
Two views of Brummley are supportable. Since both parties agreed
to the admission of the test results, the case can be characterized as
one involving admission by stipulation. This is analogous to the status
of the polygraph in a number of jurisdictions as typified by People v.
Hauser,34 although a subtle difference exists between the two.1 35 So
too, the case can be analogized to State v. Towns, 36 wherein the court
admitted polygraph test results in order to avoid prejudice. In Brum-
mley it appears that the court admitted the test results primarily
because the defendant "opened the door" by introducing evidence of
the manner in which the test was administered. As such, the issue
of prejudice was quite possibly foremost in the judge's mind, and the
defense counsel's failure to object totally irrelevant. In either view, the
case is likely to be limited to its facts and will not have much effect
on the standards for admissibility of PSE results in evidence.
Hearsay
The hearsay hurdle which the PSE shares with the polygraph
results from the attempted introduction of out-of-court utterances.
Lie detector advocates have long argued that the subject's responses
are not introduced to prove the truth of the mattter asserted; rather,
these responses are revealed only in order to support the opinion of
an expert concerning the truthfulness of the subject's statements.
While these advocates often recognize that the subject's statements
are hearsay, they contend they should be admitted, in light of the
trustworthiness of the evidence.
Semantical arguments aside, however, the defendant's statements
are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Lie detector
test results are not admitted merely to show that the defendant sub-
mitted to the test, but rather to show the truth or falsity of the
statement elicited. As such, the examiner will be testifying on the
actual question of guilt or innocence, which makes his testimony quite
unlike that of any other expert.
133 At the time this article went to press this case was on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana.
13 184 Cal. 418, 193 P.2d 937 (Cal. App. 1948). See also text accompanying note 104 supra.
135 The polygraph evidence in Hauser was admitted pursuant to a formal stipulation, in con-
trast to the informal agreement in Brummley.
136 35 Ohio App. 2d 237, 301 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
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Moreover, the argument for admissibility based on the trust-
worthness of the evidence is specious. While this argument may have
some validity in the case of a polygraph, any characterization of PSE
results as "trustworthy" ignores the adverse findings of the Kubis
Report and the substantial doubt cast upon the validity and reliability
of the PSE via the report.
Sixth Amendment
An attempt by the prosecution to have PSE test results admitted
in a criminal trial would also conflict with the protection afforded a
defendant by the sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him. The cases involving this right focus on two factors:
first, the personal presence of the witness at the trial; and second,
the opportunity to cross-examine such witness. '37 While the right is
similar to the hearsay rule, 3 8 it is not subject to the rule's many
exceptions. 39
It has been suggested that in the case of lie detection evidence,
the right to confront an accuser and cross-examine him is met by
the presence of the examiner in court. But, both the examiner and
the PSE device are necessary to obtain deception results. The ex-
aminer's testimony is based on his interpretation of the strip charts,
and it is impossible for the defendant to inquire of the machine itself
how it "decided" to show different stress patterns. As such, the ex-
aminer's testimony is clearly hearsay.
As Judge Kaufman commented in United States v. Stromberg,140
where polygraph results were at issue,
a machine cannot be cross-examined; its "testimony" as inter-
preted by an expert is, in that sense, the most glaring and
blatant hearsay. 141
In light of the fact that the sixth amendment has not yet been
emasculated to the point where expert testimony based on hearsay
is admissible, an attempt by the prosecution to introduce such evidence
would be properly overruled.
The Integrity of the Judicial Process
An abiding concern has long existed over the admission of poly-
graph test results and its effect upon the traditional function of the
jury. The basis for this concern stems from the belief that lie detec-
tion evidence goes right to the heart of the judicial process, i.e., the
137 MCCORMICK'S, supra note 87, § 252.
139 See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953).
140 179 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
141 Id. at 280.
19751
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
determination of guilt or innocence. 142 In response, lie detector advo-
cates argue that such skepticism underestimates the jury's intel-
ligence and that evidence of this nature should be admissible merely
as an aid in the ultimate search for the truth.
Although compelling in their arguments, these advocates casually
overlook both the nature of the criminal juror and the intrinsic pre-
dilection of the average American towards the infallibility of tech-
nology. Admittedly, the educational level of the American citizen is
higher than when the quest for admission of such evidence began. But
it does not necessarily follow that the average juror is so well edu-
cated. 14 Moreover, in an age of rampant technological growth, it
should be no surprise that the individual who depends upon a machine
to wake him, cook his meals, transport him and entertain him would
likewise depend upon a machine to ascertain the truthfulness of a
defendant's statements. Support for exclusion of such evidence on these
grounds can be found in the newly-adopted federal rules of evidence,
which recognize that certain evidence should not be admitted when
its value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair pre-
judice or of misleading the jury.1 "
Weight
In the event that the PSE survives the foregoing hurdles, a final
issue will arise upon admission of its results - what weight should
be accorded such evidence. The consensus appears to be that PSE
evidence should not be deemed conclusive as to guilt. Michael Kradz,
a PSE expert, has suggested that test results should be used "only
as an investigative aid, not as conclusive evidence that the subject is
guilty.' 1 45 To deem it conclusive, he believes, would signal the end of
the judicial system as we know it.14
In a similar view, Colonel McQuiston, a PSE co-inventor, re-
marked in testimony before the House Subcommittee Hearings on
the PSE, that test results should never be given conclusive weight
unless it would establish the subject's innocence.147 Admittedly, the
142 See R. FERGUSON & A. MILLER, THE POLYGRAPH IN COURT 49 (1973).
14See Beiser, Are Juries Representative?, 57 JUDICATURE 194, 197 (1974), wherein the
author discusses the educational level of juries and notes the "automatic exclusion of many
professionals from jury service."
14 FED. R. EvlD. 403.
'45 Telephone interview with Michael P. Kradz, January 16, 1975.
146 Id.
147 McQuiston Testimony, supra note 9, in Moorhead Hearings at 360.
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latter suggestion renders the PSE somewhat more palatable to the
defendant attempting to establish innocence, while simultaneously rec-
ognizing the imbalance of investigative resources existing between the
state and the criminal defendant. Nevertheless, it is naive to expect
the courts to accord the defendant such a benefit while denying the
same to the State.
In the final analysis, it appears that the PSE in its quest for
judicial recognition will encounter resistance at least as severe as
that faced by other forms of lie detection over the past fifty years.
Indeed, the lack of support by the experts in the field of lie detection,
when coupled with the current conflict over the validity and reliability
of the PSE system, suggest that at best considerable time will pass
before the Frye standards are approachable. Moreover, should the
PSE succeed in meeting these standards, questions of admission of
hearsay, right to confrontation and integrity of the judicial process
must still be faced.
Remedies Against Those Employing the PSE
The foregoing discussion, focusing on the efficacy of the PSE and
the related issues surrounding its admissibility in evidence, necessarily
ignores the more fundamental problem which the use of the PSE
presents. It will often prove inconsequential that the results of the
PSE test are inadmissible before a tribunal. For the use of the PSE
by the private sector is substantial and will no doubt increase as the
market potential is vigorously tapped. 1 8 Law enforcement agencies
have already discovered the PSE's possibilities and undoubtedly other
140 In a recent survey of 423 of their customers conducted by Dektor, the 46 responses received
revealed that 23 firms conducting PSE services administered 6118 tests (as well as 18,2371unspecified" tests), while 13 private employers reported they conducted 5285 tests with
their employees. DAHM STUDY, supra note 7, in Moorhead Hearings at 257. Certainly these
figures cannot be termed complete in that Dektor's survey queried only 8% of its
customers. Yet these figures do indicate that PSE testing of employees is becoming
increasingly pervasive throughout American industry. The rationale for this increase is
reflected by concern expressed in the last few years over the dramatic rise in industial
theft. Estimates of the extent of such theft vary, but one source has stated that the figure
is "more than four million dollars annually" and further notes that "authorities agree
that 60-75 per cent of that total is chargeable to employee related thefts." Letter from
Michael Green, President of National Polygraph Co., to CLEVELAND MAGAZINE, March
1975, at 9-10. Dektor believes that the PSE is an excellent tool to help employers combat
that crime. According to Colonel McQuiston,
the overwhelming majority of such examinations serve the useful, perhaps
essential purpose of establishing that the employee or prospective employee is
honest and trustworthy and allow him and the employing agency to derive the
benefits of that knowledge.
DEKTOR REPORT, supra note 12, at 13, in Moorhead Hearings at 236. Notwithstanding
this opinion, such employee testing necessarily intrudes on an employee's innermost
thoughts and emotions and could result in the loss of employment, not only from the
company which tested the employee, but possibly future employment as well. Because the
tests are taped, the results could be computerized and become part of the vast data banks
which are currently being set up across the country, thus making PSE results available to
the subject's future employers. See also, Sen. Ervin's Statement, supra note 81, in Moor-
head Hearings at 788.
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governmental agencies will not be far behind. 149 This use of the PSE
is not likely to be deterred by the prospects of its inadmissibility into
evidence and thus the unsuspecting employee-citizen faces the under-
mining of the very fabric of traditional privacy concepts. Conse-
quently, the employee-citizen will be forced to turn to the courts in
an effort to vindicate himself on an individual basis and potentially
to effectuate a deterrance to the indiscriminate use of the PSE.
149 It is more difficult to establish the degree to which the PSE is used in government employ-
ment. Colonel Charles McQuiston's response to questions of the Moorhead Subcommittee
concerning the purchase of the machines by the federal government reveals the following:
Serial No. Date of Sale Agency
1560(1) June 22, 1974 NASA, Ames Research Center,
Moffet Field, California
1572(1) May 24, 1974 Patuxent Air Test Center,
Patuxent, Maryland
1493 November 14,1973 Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
Aberdeen, Maryland
326(1) July, 1973 Sharpe Army Depot,
Lathrop, California
233(1) April 19,1973 VA Hospital,
Danville, Illinois
63(1) July 5, 1972 Drug Rehabilitation Center,
U.S. Naval Air Station,
Yukon, Florida
51(1) May, 1972 USAFOSI,
Washington, D.C.
31 & 32 (2) January 24, 1972 USAMERDCc CDC
Ft. Belvoir, Va.
10(1) May, 1972 Ft. George G. Meade
Ft. Meade, Maryland
6(1) - Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
Aberdeen, Maryland
Answers of Charles R. McQuiston to Moorhead Committee Question 10, in Moorhead
Hearings at 363.
The Department of Defense has barred the use of the polygraph as a "screening or
selection device as a condition of employment" for its employees, with the exception of
those of the National Security Council. Statement of David 0. Cooke, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Office of the Comptroller, Department of the Defense, in Moorhead Hearings
at 421. Presumbly the same restrictions would apply to use of the PSE. Mr. Cooke revealed
that the Department of Defense had bought five PSE devices but no longer used them
because of their lack of reliability and the devices had been either "dismantled or turned
in for surplus disposal." Id. at 426.
Mr. Cooke further testified that the Army dismantled two of the PSEs it owned and
transferred one to the Air Force. Also, he noted the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) bought one as well, but is transferring it to "a research and development office
in Massachusetts."
The Department of Defense also compiled a list of how many PSEs were owned
by which agency. This list showed the following:
Army 2 (dismantled in May 1974)
Air Force 1
NSA 2
Id. at 430.
It must be noted that this chart and Mr. Cooke's testimony do not coincide with
Dektor's accounts of Department of Defense purchases, First, Patuxent Air Test Center
bought a PSE a month before the Hearings. Secondly, the Dektor Report shows the
Army bought four, the Air Force bought two, and the Navy one; which means that one
Navy, one Air Force and one Army PSE remain to be accounted for. Query: indeed, if
they are not reliable, where are they and for what are they being used?
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Thus, this discussion will focus on two distinct approaches to the
problem: first, whether the subject of a PSE test has a common law
tort action available; and second, whether such individual has an
action for violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Chapter 42
of the United States Code, section 1983.150
Common Law Tort for Invasion of Privacy
The theory suggesting the existence of a common law cause of ac-
tion for violation of the right to privacy was initially presented in 1890
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 151 In their celebrated article
they enunciated the classic definition of the common law right to
privacy:
The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, senti-
ments, and emotions shall be communicated to others; . . .
and even if he has chosen to give them expression, he gen-
erally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which
shall be given them.15
2
Since then the state of this law has been compared to a "haystack
in a hurricane." 15 3 Nevertheless, the late Dean Prosser succeeded in
bringing some semblance of order to this chaos through division of
the form of the violation into four distinct categories: (1) public
disclosure, (2) false light in the public eye, (3) appropriation, and
(4) intrusion.1 54 Though failing to receive universal acceptance,
Prosser's work has been recognized for its intrinsic value by the
courts.1 55 Employing this categorical approach permits dismissal of
the first three classifications as being without merit, and thus limits
the discussion to the fourth.
15042 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Commonly termed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the statute
reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
151 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
112 Id. at 198.
153Ettore v. Philco T.V. Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
926 (1956).
"UProsser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383-86 (1960).
"'
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 803-14
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Contra, Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect
of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964).
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Intrusion
An action for intrusion is premised on the proposition that one's
solitude or personal affairs are inviolate. Consequently, plaintiff need
merely demonstrate intrusion into a realm deemed private or personal,
sufficient to offend a reasonable man.15 6
There is little question that the PSE as heralded by the manufac-
turer is capable of plumbing the depths of human thoughts and
emotions. These thoughts and emotions when unexpressed are per-
haps the most private facet of an individual's character. As such, it
is inconceivable that a court would deny a remedy to an aggrieved
individual on the basis that the PSE does not intrude into a private
realm.
Justice Brandeis, in his now-famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,15 7 considered this facet of human awareness important enough
to warrant constitutional protection:
[The Makers of our Constitution] recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and satis-
faction of life are to be found in the material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions, and their sensations. 58
Although Justice Brandeis was speaking in the context of govern-
mental intrusion via wiretapping, the analogy to the PSE is by no
means superfluous. Indeed, the degree of intrusion rendered by wire-
tapping or for that matter, electronic surveillance in general, is even
less than that resulting from the use of the PSE. For, while the victim
of a wiretapping intrusion has at least intended to vocalize his thoughts
or emotions, the fears or anxieties of a PSE subject can be detected
without either his aid or knowledge.
In this light, it seems assured that the use of the PSE will be
deemed offensive to the reasonable man in a number of situations.
Foremost in this regard are those situations in which the PSE is
used on private employees for periodic screening as contrasted to pre-
employment testing or suspect testing in relation to a crime.
Remedy for Violation of Constitutional Rights
Where PSE testing is performed by a governmental entity, the
possibility of a cause of action for violation of the subject's civil
rights arises. The PSE is likely to be used or abused in two widely
156 PROSSER, supra note 155, § 117.
157277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'-8 Id. at 478 (dissent).
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diverse government functions, law enforcement15 9 and public em-
ployment.1 6 So too, this use or abuse will occur in either of two
situations, overt or covert testing. This discussion will isolate specific
constitutional amendments and analyze the potential for their violation
through use of the PSE. Where significant, the analysis will incor-
porate the distinctions likely to result from either PSE use in the
diverse government functions or its use in the two testing situations.
The Fourth Amendment
The possibilities for use inherent in the Psychological Stress Eval-
uator pose a serious threat to the fourth amendment guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. The most serious aspects of this
threat occur as a result of the PSE's potential for covert use. Dektor
itself has recognized this potential and has even impliedly suggested
the desirability of such use in certain situations,161 such as developing
case leads in police investigation by telephone:
Normally, a covert PSE examination would be of an investi-
gatory, stress evaluation type, such as an investigating
officer might conduct by telephone on several suspects to
question them about the case and record the conversation.
The officer might determine, from a lack of stress, that the
subject was not involved .... 162
To be sure, the possibilities for covert use of the PSE are endless,
but an analysis of the case-lead approach advocated by Dektor should
prove most fruitful to this discussion.
159 Some indication of the extent of use by law enforcement agencies can be seen in the
previously mentioned survey conducted by Dektor on a portion of its customers. The
eight law enforcement agencies who responded to the questionnaire had conducted 4,027
tests. DAHM STUDY, supra note 7, at 2, in Moorhead Hearings at 256. These agencies
apparently are local police departments as opposed to the Central Intelligence Agency or
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See Statement of Harold L. Brownman, Deputy
Director for Management and Services, Central Intelligence Agency, in Moorhead Hearings
at 643; Testimony by Bell P. Herndon, Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in Moorhead Hearings at 626.
165 See discussion in note 148 supra.
161 If the purpose (of using the PSE) is to obtain a case lead and a direction
for continuing investigation as in screening a large number of possible suspects,
the examination might be overt or covert ....
Answers of Charles R. McQuiston to Moorhead Committee Question 2, in Moorhead Hear-
ings at 361.
162 Id. at 362. It is implicit in this example that in most covert PSE testing situations no
search warrants would be sought. Yet this discussion in no way suggests that a warrant
based on probable cause authorizing PSE surveillance should be issued under any circum-
stances. While the Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), eliminated the
distinction between instrumentalities and fruits of crime, and "mere evidence," the
majority left open the question of whether there might be "items of evidential value
whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and
seizure." Id. at 303. It would appear that a PSE test should fall into the category of arguable
exceptions, especially if one is wont to adopt the philosophy of Justice Douglas' dissent
in Warden that the fourth amendment presumes a "zone that no police can enter -
whether in 'hot pursuit' or armed with a meticulously proper warrant." Id. at 325.
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The first question to be addressed is whether such covert use
constitutes a search and seizure. In United States v. Dionisio,163 the
Supreme Court held there was no seizure where the defendant's
voice was taped for the purposes of identification, since this is "a
physical characteristic ... constantly exposed to the public." 1M Clearly
this case can and should be distinguished from the covert testing situa-
tion under discussion. In contrast to the normal taping situation, PSE
analysis lays bare the unexpressed emotions of the subject. Conse-
quently, the purpose for which taping of the voice is conducted and the
extent to which such taping intrudes on the privacy of the subject is
far different in the PSE situation. Moreover, in the scenario upon
which this discussion is based, the use of wiretapping is implicit.
Nor does it require much imagination to envision other situations in
which surreptitious use of the PSE could be effectuated by "bugging."
And it can be inferred from past decisions that electronic surveillance
or wiretapping without prior judicial authorization is per se a search
and seizure. 165
Once a search and seizure has been established, it must be demon-
strated that the action taken was unreasonable. In Katz v. United
States,166 the leading case in this area, the defendant was convicted of
using the telephone to transmit gambling information in violation of
a federal statute. Evidence introduced at trial included telephone
conversations of the defendant which had been overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic recording device to the public
phone Katz had used to make his calls. In holding that such activity
on the part of the government constituted an illegal search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the Court formulated
a test: whether the subject of the government's activities justifiably
relied upon the privacy which was invaded. 167 Thus the important
question is whether the Katz test is met; i.e., would the government's
covert use of the PSE violate the privacy upon which the subject jus-
tifiably relied.
In the situation suggested by Dektor, where a police investigator
questions a subject via telephone, it seems likely that the subject
would be relying on his privacy. While concededly he might not ex-
pect his answers to be private, he would certainly expect his emotional
state to remain so.
163410 U.S. 1 (1973).
I"Id. at 14. See also United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
165See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). A possible exception is found in
national security cases. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
1- 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For an excellent discussion of Katz, see Note, Katz and the Fourth
Amendment, 23 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 63 (1973).
16 389 U.S. at 353.
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Moreover, this expectation of privacy appears to be reasonable
under the circumstances. Although the courts in applying the Katz
test have uniformly found certain situations where a claim of reason-
able expectation will be rejected, such as jails, open fields and yards, 1
it is questionable whether the same results would obtain if the con-
versation were taped and measured on a PSE to detect the suspect's
psychological stress. In the circumstance under discussion, where
measurement is made from a phone conversation, the external en-
vironment is such that the subject would be entirely reasonable in
expecting that his unexpressed thoughts would remain private.
Nor should the results differ if the subject had engaged in conver-
sation with a party who had consented to its taping and subsequent
PSE analysis. While the Supreme Court has noted that there can be
no reasonable expectation of privacy where one party to a conversation
gives his consent to eavesdropping, 169 the use of the PSE in such a
situation presents a distinction sufficient to challenge the court's
rationale.
Admittedly a consenting party may permit an eavesdrop to a
conversation and thus present the government with what is in effect
the contents of the conversation. But what he has given them is
predictably no more than what he had, or more pointedly what he
heard. The introduction of the PSE into this scenario alters the out-
come. For then he presents the government with that which he never
had - since it was never given to him - a record of the speaker's
hidden emotions. In view of the fact that the speaker never meant to
impart such a record, it would be surprising indeed if his reliance on
the privacy of this aspect of the conversation was deemed unreasonable.
Another issue of major importance in the covert use situation
concerns the treatment of a confession induced by the utilization of
PSE results. Since covert testing and analysis could properly be clas-
sified as a search, an interrogation procedure which confronts the
accused with the results of the PSE is analogous to the illegal in-
trusion which resulted in a confession in Wong Sun v. United States.170
Unquestionably, a confession induced by illegally seized evidence is
16United States v. Hitchcock, 467 P.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916
(1973) (documents hidden in jail cell); United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.
1972) (boxes hidden in a clump of trees in an open field); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d
80, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129 (1969) (marijuana growing under a fig tree near
landlord's back door and tenant's door); and other cases cited in supra note 166, at 68 nn.
46, 47, 48.
169 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
170371 U.S. 471 (1963).
19751
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
inadmissible in the absence of a showing that the confession has been
obtained by "means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."171
The Fifth Amendment
The overt administration of a PSE examination raises issues
resting on both due process considerations and the privilege against
self-incrimination.1 7 2 The due process issue stems from the question
of whether the very use of the PSE is inherently coercive in a criminal
interrogation setting, rendering any confession so derived involuntary
and consequently inadmissible. The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals, when faced with the analogous polygraph testing situation
in United States v. Tyler,1 73 spurned arguments for inherent coercive-
ness and held that, if otherwise voluntary, a confession derived from
a polygraph test would not be excluded. In light of the similarity
between overt PSE testing and polygraph testing, it is unlikely that
the treatment accorded the PSE will differ. Indeed, the decision in
State v. Brumley, 74 wherein the court admitted a confession made
after adverse results of a PSE test were communicated to the de-
fendant, bears out this reasoning.
The privilege against self-incrimination raises the question of
whether a criminal defendant may be compelled by law enforcement
authorities to take a PSE test. In Schmerber v. California,75 the
Supreme Court noted the adverse impact on the privilege created
by polygraph testing:
To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort
will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis
of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke
the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.
1 76
171 Id. at 488. Exclusion of a "tainted" confession should not be contingent upon proof by
the defendant of coercive or oppressive circumstances surrounding the confession. People
v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865 (1969). Contra, e.g., State
v. Traub, 181 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964).
172 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
173 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
174 Docket No. 10,199 (5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Parish of West Carroll, La., 1974). See text accom-
panying note 132 supra.
175 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is dependent upon the compelled activity's being testimonial in nature. As the Schmerber
Court explained, "The privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature .... . .384 U.S. at 761. Clearly, not only would the PSE subject's
verbal responses be protected by the privilege but, due to their communicative nature,
his physiological responses would be as well.
176 Id. at 764.
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This dicta would seem to indicate that a defendant may not be subject
to a PSE test against his will. A recent Supreme Court ruling, how-
ever, raises the possibility that illicit government practices may well
undercut the fifth amendment privilege.'7
Right to Privacy
The great importance of the constitutional right to privacy stems
from its application to governmental action outside the criminal arena.
This is particularly crucial to the government employee confronted
with employment screening via the PSE. 7 8
The existence of the constitutional right to privacy under the
fourteenth amendment was first accorded judicial recognition in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,179 wherein the Supreme Court per Justice Douglas
found such a right in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. 180 Eight
years later, in Roe v. Wade,'81 Justice Blackmun noted that roots of
the right could be traced to the first amendment; the fourth and
fifth amendments; in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights; in the ninth
amendment; or in the concept of ordered liberty guaranteed by the
first section of the fourteenth amendment."' He observed, however,
that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' . are included in this guar-
antee of personal privacy.' '8 3
In applying the "ordered liberty" test in the context of a PSE
examination, it is necessary to consider whether an individual's
right to control the extent and form of his communication is within
the "zones of privacy" to which Justice Douglas referred in Gris-
wold.1 84 One commentator has suggested that "sensual and emotional
impressions and expression" must be considered within the scope of
these zones. 185 At the very minimum an individual's thoughts and
emotions must be protected by what Justice Brandeis termed the
"right to be let alone."' 86
1"tSee United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that a
defendant could be compelled to provide the authorities with a voice exemplar. Presumably
the compelled voice exemplar could then be subjected to PSE analysis as well, without
the defendant's consent.
17 See note 149 supra.
179 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Various justices of the Supreme Court had previously given
recognition to the value of the right of privacy. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961) (Douglas, J. concurring); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(Brandeis, J. dissenting).
180 381 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted).
181 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
's2 Id at 152.
183 Id.
184 381 U.S. at 484.
18sA. MILLER, THE ASSAULT OF PRIVACY 178 (1971), citing Batt, Law and the Bedroom,
SATURDAY REV., Aug. 3, 1968, at 45 [hereinafter cited as MILLER).
186 Olmsread v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
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This same conclusion is suggested from the philisophical approach
taken by Professor Alan Westin. In addressing the analogous problem
presented by the polygraph, he deliniated three issues:
First is the attempt to penetrate the "inner domain" of
individual belief, tendency, and inclination through the ques-
tions of such topics used so often in polygraph sessions.
The American Constitution sets up a basic distinction be-
tween acts and beliefs, and the style of polygraph screening
.. .violates the injunction against inquiry into belief by
government. Second is the interference with the individual's
sense of personal autonomy and reserve created by machine
sensing of the individual's emotional responses to personal
inquiries in a formal, public proceeding. If individuals confess
because they feel they have lost their basic autonomy, we may
detect some personnel risks, but we will leave citizens stripped
of what made them feel like independent persons in a free
society. Third is the increased psychological power over indi-
viduals that authorities acquire when they apply the full
panoply of large black box, moving stylus, wires, two-way
mirrors, formal interrogation, and so forth, to a citizen seek-
ing to work for a corporation or a government agency in a
free society. 187
First Amendment
It has been suggested that such government activity as wiretap-
ping and electronic surveillance constitute a violation of the first
amendment right of freedom of speech, 188 the rationale being that
"expression becomes less free and is directly curtailed by the fear
of such surveillance."' 89 This theory could be applied to the use of the
Psychological Stress Evaluator as well. Indeed, since the PSE pur-
ports to test the truth of the spoken word, the negative impact of
such "psychological surveillance"' 90 on freedom of speech could be
overwhelming. If an individual's every word could be tested for
veracity, it is inevitable that fear of reprisal will inhibit his commu-
nications. To be sure, Professor Alan Westin has noted that,
"[w] ritings by leading social scientists have made it clear that obser-
vation by listening or watching which is known to the subject neces-
187 A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 238-39 (1967) (hereinafter cited as WESTIN].
18 See King, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Considera-
tion, 66 DICKINSON L. REV. 17 (1961). See also 119 CONG. REC. 23,491 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1973) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
169 King, supra note 188, at 25.
190 Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1966).
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sarily exercises a restrictive influence over him."1 91 Analogy to the
PSE indicates that its use will operate to create a "chilling effect"
on free speech.
Moreover, the political implications of the PSE can only be grimly
imagined. It is foreseeable that the use of the PSE will one day be
extended beyond the mere testing of factual statements to testing of
attitudes and even loyalties. And with such an extension would come
the trampling of basic first amendment rights of freedom of speech
and association.1 92
In view of the traditional treatment of governmental surveillance
as a fourth amendment issue, adoption of a first amendment analysis
of PSE use will require a fundamental change in judicial attitude.
The greater protections afforded by a first amendment approach
manifestly warrant this tack. For if PSE testing is shown to exert
a "chilling effect" on freedom of speech, the courts will have little
choice but to prohibit such activity, rather than merely limiting it
via fourth amendment proscriptions.
193
Limitations on Remedies
Notwithstanding the fact that potential remedies do exist for the
use or abuse of the PSE, limitations of a legal and practical nature
will effectively prevent a PSE subject from utilizing these remedies.
Disclosure
The aforementioned approaches to effectuating a legal remedy will
be limited both in the covert situation by the difficulty of establishing
191 Id. at 1045.
192 For an example of the potential for abuse which such a situation could create, consider
the address of President Harry Truman to the National Civil Service League, as quoted
in the New York Times, May 3, 1952, at 22, col. 4.
The loyalty program was designed to protect innocent employees as well as
the Government. When I set it up, I intended it to expose the guilty and at
the same time to safeguard the rights and the reputations of those who were
innocent. But I have become increasingly concerned in recent months by
attempts to use the loyalty program as a club with which to beat Government
employes over the head.
Political gangsters are attempting to pervert the program into an instru-
ment of intimidation and blackmail, to coerce or destroy any who dare oppose
them. These men and those who abet them have besmirched the reputations
of decent, loyal public servants. They have not hesitated to lie, under cover
of Congressional immunity, of course, and to repeat the lies again and again.
This is a matter for great concern. These tatics contain the seeds of tyranny.
Can we be sure that people who employ such tactics are really loyal to our
form of Government, with its Bill of Rights and its tradition of individual
liberty? The fact is that they are breaking these things down. They are under-
mining the foundation stones of our Constitution. I believe such men betray
our country and all it stands for. I believe they are as grave a menace as the
Communists.
193 For example, where warrants have been obtained or rights of the subject have been waived.
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that a PSE examination did in fact take place, and in the overt situa-
tion by the difficulty likely to be encountered in obtaining the results
of a PSE examination.
Clearly an unsuspecting subject will not institute a cause of action.
Moreover, the scenario suggested by Dektor ' 94 indicates the ease with
which a PSE examination can be conducted without the subject's
cognizance and hence without his ever knowing that his rights have
been violated. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that
PSE results are likely to be employed derivatively to furnish a lead
to other incriminating evidence.
In addition, while Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides a defendant in a federal court with the right of dis-
covery of scientific test and experiment results, his lack of knowledge
concerning the administration of the PSE test substantially impairs
the value of this tool.195 And even if a request for test results were
routinely made, the likelihood exists that such information would
not be forthcoming.1 96
With regard to the second disclosure limitation, the difficulty
in obtaining the results of a polygraph test has been cited as one of
the major objections to its use.197 In all likelihood, this same difficulty
will be experienced by a PSE subject. The only possible circumven-
194 See text accompanying note 162 supra.
195 One reason for the limited value is its sole application to federal criminal actions, while
the situations will occur with greater frequency in a state proceeding. Less than a majority
of the states have promulgated criminal discovery rules. For a partial list of those jurisdic-
tions, see Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and Prosecution - The Developing
Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 439 n.15 (1972). Since that
time, Arkansas and New York have enacted such statutes. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§43-2011.1-.4; N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw §§240-10-.40 (McKinney Supp. 1971). The
same problem would arise in a civil action; for, although the information would be
subject to civil discovery rules, the potential plaintiff would again be unaware that
the surveillance took place.
196 The case of United States v. Ellsberg, No. 8354 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (charges dismissed,
Dec. 30, 1973), is a good example of a situation where the government failed to disclose
illegal wiretapping. Cf. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 353 F. Supp. 515 (D.D.C. 1973) (a
companion civil case).
197 Former Sen. Sam Ervin noted the existence of the problem of availability of test results
in his statement submitted for the record of the Moorhead Hearings:
The third area of concern to me is the dissemination and availability of the
testing results. There is every likelihood that a record of the employee's
responses may find its way into the personnel files of the company or agency
and be transmitted as "reference material" when the worker leaves, despite
assurances to the contrary. In fact, one individual who contacted the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights told of his frustrating efforts to learn the contents
of a polygraph test he had taken for employment with one law enforcement
agency after learning the other law enforcement agencies he applied with had
also seen the results. These agencies did not require such tests for employment.
He was told that the results of his test were confidential!
Moorhead Hearings at 788.
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tion of this problem appears to lie with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.198 If it can be demonstrated that a lie detection agency comes
within the purview of this Act, disclosure of PSE test results will be
required. 199
State Action
The requirement of state action in a suit brought under the
fourteenth amendment places a severe limitation on the availability
of remedies.20 0 Thus, an employee in the private sector is left only with
an action sounding in tort, which in itself is subject to pernicious
limitation.20'
The state action problem received extensive treatment in 1971
by Professor Herman.20 2 The thrust of his discussion centered on the
fact that the fourteenth amendment could be extended to private
corporations by virtue of the overwhelming degree of state involve-
ment in their affairs. 203 While noting that this argument has gained
some judicial support in recent years,20 4 Professor Herman recognized
that such an approach would require "significant extension of the
scope of state action. '20 5 This latter comment is nearly prophetic.
In the four years since Professor Herman's treatment, it has
become increasingly apparent that no such judicial extension of the
concept will occur. The two major decisions which addressed the
issue in the intervening years, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 2 6 and
198 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
19915 U.S.C. § 1681g (1970).
(a) Every consumer reporting agency shall . . . disclose to the consumer:
(1) the nature and substance of all information (except medical information)
in its files on the consumer at the time of the request.
John Spafford, President of Assoc. Credit Bureaus, Inc. of Houston, Texas, has observed
that the F.C.R.A. could be said to apply to investigative agencies. See Spafford, Consumer
Credit: Giving Creditors Their Due, 11 TRIAL 35, 50 (Jan.-Feb., 1975). This view is
supported by the broad statutory definition of "consumer reporting agency" by the
F.C.R.A. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1970).
200 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...."
201 Probably the most far-reaching limitation on remedial actions is that resulting from
consent by the PSE subject. See text accompanying notes 214-221 infra.
202 Herman, Privacy, the Prospective Employee and Employment Testing: The Need to
Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 140-49 (1971).
203 Prof. Herman considered the following to be important: private corporations are
statutorily created; the states are already involved in "private activities" via statutory and
administrative law which seeks to regulate private corporate activity; state action in failing
to act to alleviate the unequal bargaining power of the employee vis-a-vis the corporation
can arguably constitute violation of the fourteenth amendment just as if the state had
acted affirmatively to create the same situation; and there is substantial government
assistance to private corporations in the form of subsidies and grants. Id. at 148-49.
204 See Siddenburg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20s Herman, supra note 202, at 149.
20407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 207 reveal instead a step back-
ward in the application of the fourteenth amendment to the private
sector.
Moose Lodge involved a black plaintiff who, as a guest of a member
of the lodge, a private club, was refused service of food or drink
because of his race. Because the club had a liquor license, the plaintiff
argued that the state regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor
control board established the requisite state action to show a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The Court, per Justice Rehnquist,
stated that "the State must have significantly involved itself with
invidious discrimination in order for the action to fall within the
ambit of constitutional prohibition," 208 and held that the regulation
of liquor in such a private club "did not sufficiently implicate the
State in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge" so as to
constitute state action.2 0 9
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,210 a 1974 decision, clearly
illustrates that state action will not be found in the private sector
even where the regulation is far more extensive. Metropolitan Edison,
though a privately owned and operated corporation, held a certificate
of public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities
Commission which made the utility subject to "extensive regulation"
by the Commission.2 11 By virtue of proof of such extensive regulation,
the plaintiff sought to come within the purview of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Rehnquist again spoke for the majority and
enunciated the test - "whether there is sufficiently close nexus be-
tween the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself. '212 He concluded that the test had not been met.213
It would appear that Professor Herman's thesis that private
corporations could be subject to the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment has been dealt a death blow by these two cases. Their
2 - -........... U.S --- --- , 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
20407 U.S. at 173.
MId. at 177.
210 ....... . -... U.S -....----- 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
21 Id. at ------------- 95 S. Ct. at 457.
The Public Utilities Commission is given extensive control over utility rates,
and over the character and quality of utility services and facilities; it is given
broad power to receive and investigate complaints, and to regulate and supervise
the activities, rules and contractual undertakings of utilities.
Id. at -.......... ,95 S. Ct. at459 n.5 (dissent) (citations omitted).
22 Id. at ------------- 95 S. Ct. at 453.
31 Id. at ------------- 95 S. Ct. at 457.
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significance insofar as the PSE is concerned is that the concept of
state action clearly remains a stringent limitation on effectuating a
PSE subject's constitutional rights.
Consent
The major barrier to successful litigation by a PSE subject is
that, in many cases, the subject has consented to being given the PSE
examination.2 1 4 Thus, the defense of consent can be asserted to defeat
both allegations of violation of the subject's fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights and his right to privacy as well as a tort action for
invasion of privacy.
The essence of the objection to this defense is seen in the statement
of a well-known lie detection expert, John Reid, "[N] o one who comes
here has to take the test. They sign a voluntary statement. '21 5
Indeed, one must inquire just how voluntary such a transaction really
is. Consider:
(1) The American Civil Liberties Report to the House Subcom-
mittee Hearings216 noted that the Moss Committee2 7 emphasized that
"as long as notations are made in any official file on an individual that
he refused to take a polygraph test, the test is in no sense voluntary. 21
(2) Arthur Miller has charged that to characterize as voluntary
the giving of such information to a person in authority or "to some-
one who dangles an attractive carrot before an individual's eyes" 21 9
is to "ignore reality. '220
(3) Professor Westin, in discussing the issues of "voluntariness"
and "consent," has branded such terms "meaningless" in the context
of the use of lie detection in private employment:
When applicants for corporate . . . service, normally well
qualified, well recommended, and with no tract of criminality
to raise questions, must submit to polygraphing or forsake
these key sources of employment in American economic life,
then consent is far from free. Or if when once hired, an em-
ployee is required to consent to periodic preventive testing as
a condition of continued employment, the employee's freedom
of choice is substantially narrowed. 2 1
2 It is general policy for employees to sign a consent form before taking an overt PSE test.
21s Franklin, Lie Detectors' Use by Industry Rises: Rights Peril Feared, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1971, at 45 col. 4.
216 ACLU REPORTS, supra note 8, in Moorhead Hearings at 7.
217 Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" by the Federal Government before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., and
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964-65) (Hon. John E. Moss, Chairman).
218 ACLU REPORTS, supra note 8, in Moorhead Hearings at 45.
219 MILLER, supra note 185, at 185.
220d. at 186.
22 WESTIN, supra note 187, at 239-40.
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It becomes abundantly clear that the courts' continued protection
of the employer-examiner results from sheer sophistry and comes at
an enormous price. Consequently, in view of the frightening potential
of the PSE, a look to the legislative arena is in order.
Legislative Action
The legislative branch has two dissimilar approaches available
to effectuate the rights of individuals who have or may be subjected to
a PSE examination - regulation of the industry or outright prohi-
bition of its sale.
Regulation pertaining to the particular use of lie detectors has
been undertaken by thirteen states.2 22 These statutes generally prohibit
the use of polygraph examinations in private employment. At the
federal level, former Senator Ervin proposed several bills which would
have made it unlawful to require pre-employment polygraph testing
or to discharge, discipline or deny promotion to an individual in the
executive departments who refuses to take a polygraph test.2 2 3 More-
over, the latter of these bills, Senate Bill 2836 would prohibit such test-
ing by any business involved in interstate commerce.224 Law enforce-
ment agencies and state and local governments were excluded from
these provisions. It would not require much effort on the part of
the legislative bodies involved to amend these statutes to extend their
coverage to include PSE examinations.
Yet, if regulation by licensing or proscribed use is the avenue
chosen by the legislature, it must be recognized that none of these
statutes, proposed or enacted, goes far enough to effectively protect
the subject's rights. Use of the PSE by law enforcement agencies,
as well as state and local governments, must also specifically regu-
lated; and outright prohibition of covert testing by PSE is neces-
sary. Further, where use of the PSE is permitted, such use must be
stringently regulated. in the overt testing situation, statutes should
require the presence of an attorney during the test so that meaningful
consent to the test will be given. Moreover, it should be provided that
only those people who are actual suspects in specific criminal acts can
be tested. "Fishing expeditions" by means of PSE examinations in
criminal investigations should be flatly prohibited.
2 ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1962); CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.2 (West 1971); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §31-5Ig (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §704 (1974); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 378-21, 22 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (Supp. 1974); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2a: 170-90.1 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §659.225
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7321 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-1 (1969);
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.120 (Supp. 1974).
2S. Bill 2156 (1971); S. Bill 2936 (1973). Both bills died in committee. See 119 CONG.
REC. 52,3491 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973).
224 119 CONG. REC. 52,3491 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
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Regulation
Two avenues of regulation should be considered; either the PSE
examiner could be licensed by the state or federal government or the
PSE could be limited to particular use by state or federal statutes.
The licensing approach is that favored by Dektor itself.2 2 5 Already
the polygraph is regulated by licensing statutes in thirteen states.
226
It would be a relatively easy matter to amend those existing state
statutes to include provisions for licensing of the PSE examiner.
Florida regulates the PSE by licensing in its administrative code,2 2 7
and recently a proposed statute regulating only PSE licensing has
been introduced into the Florida legislature.2 n Virginia is also con-
templating an amendment to its existing Polygraph Examiner's Law
to include PSE examiners.2 2 9
Prohibition
It well may be that, in view of the questionable efficacy of the
Psychological Stress Evaluator and the serious threat that its use
poses to individual rights, the only legitimate course of action open
to resolve this problem is the actual prohibition on the sale of the
PSE. Even the inventor of the device, Colonel Charles McQuiston,
has acknowledged that the "PSE represents a threat in the wrong
hands. '230 Moreover, it has been suggested that the regulation of
polygraph use has been ineffective with respect to employment test-
ing.2 31 There is little likelihood of greater success with the PSE, while
the possibility for total failure of any such regulatory scheme is
exacerbated by its intrinsic potential for covert use.
225 McQuiston Testimony, supra note 9, in Moorhead Hearings at 355.
226See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§71-2201 to -2225 (Cum. Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§493.40-.56 (Cum. Supp. 1975-76); GA. CODE ANN. §§84-5001 to -5016 (1970),
as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 202-1 to -30 (Smith Hurd
1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§329-010-.990 (1970); MISS. CODE ANN. §§73-29-1
to -47 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 648.005-.210 (1973) N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-31A-1
to -11 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-49-1 -.8 (1965), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§43-31-01 to -17 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 §§ 1451 -
1476 (Supp. 1974-75); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4413 (29cc) (Supp. 1974-75); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54-729.01 to -.018 (1974).
227 FLA. ADM. CODE lc-4.01- .05 (1972).
228 Proposed S. Bill 571.
2 Moorhead Hearings at 369 (Exhibit C).
2o McQuiston Testimony, supra note 9, in Moorhead Hearings at 355.
21 Lykken, The Right Way to Use a Lie Detector, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, March 1975, at 56.
Two years ago I testified before the Minnesota Legislature in support of a
bill that would prohibit employers from requiring or even requesting employees
or prospective employees to take polygraph examinations. The bill became law,
but the law is ineffective. Employers continue to screen applicants because
the present law is difficult to enforce. The most effective course of action might
be for legislatures to proscribe the sale of lie-detector services for employee
screening. It is much easier to police a few sellers than the myriad offending
employers.
Id. at 60.
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Summary
The Psychological Stress Evaluator is in its nascent stage of influ-
ence in both the private and public sectors of American society. This
device operates on the theory that differential stress in the voice
produced by vibrations of the vocal cords can be measured so as to
detect deception. This note has sought to explain the functioning of
the PSE and to denominate the issues which its use will thrust upon
the American legal system.
Empirical studies reveal vast discrepancies in reported validity,
suggesting that the resolution of this issue must await further inde-
pendent study. Moreover, the issue of reliability has yet to be ad-
dressed. Insofar as acceptability by the scientific community is de-
pendent on the positive resolution of these two issues, PSE exam-
ination results will not be readily admitted as scientific evidence by
either state or federal courts. Beyond the mere question of its efficacy
as scientific evidence, the courts will be forced to confront other
evidentiary issues which will jeopardize the quest for admission of
PSE results.
Implicit in the utilization of the PSE for detection of deception
is its extraordinary potential for abuse. Unfortunately, traditional
tort remedies will prove ineffective in combating such abuse due to the
limitations imposed by the legal system itself.
But the major question which the PSE presents to the legal system
is neither its validity, its admissibility nor the lack of actionable
remedies. Rather, further inquiry must be made into the basic
question of whether the use of even the most valid and scientifically
accepted PSE has any place in American society. While all Americans
deplore the increase in industrial crime, at the same time the Amer-
ican worker cannot be said to have "surrendered his basic rights
and liberties as a citizen by entering the job market. '232 Clearly the
public is entitled to protection from the PSE before its use becomes
so commonplace that it pervades the American way of life; for, by
then, it will be virtually impossible to either control or eradicate its
pernicious influence on the individual in society.
Deborah Lewis Hiller
2 Sen. Ervin's Statement, supra note 81, in Moorhead Hearings at 787.
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